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Managing Financial Market Expectations: The Role of Central Bank 
Transparency and Central Bank Communication 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we study the influence of central bank transparency and informal central bank 
communication on the formation of money market expectations. The sample covers nine 
major central banks from January 1999 to July 2007. We find, first, that transparency reduces 
the bias in money market expectations and dampens their variation. Second, informal 
communications help manage financial market expectations by reducing the variation of 
expectations. Third, various subcategories of the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) transparency 
index lead to a smaller bias in expectations (in particular, evaluation of policy outcome and 
explanation of interest rate decisions) and to a reduction in the variation of expectations (in 
particular, explicit prioritization of objectives and provision of information on unanticipated 
macroeconomic disturbances). 
 
JEL:   E52,  E58 
Keywords:  Central Bank Communication, Central Bank Transparency, Financial Market 
Expectations, Interest Rate Decision, Monetary Policy, Money Market 
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1990s, central banks across the world have worked hard to increase their 
transparency: objectives and goals are specified and quantified, macroeconomic forecasts are 
published, interest rate decisions are announced and immediately explained, and some central 
banks provide indications of the likely course of monetary policy in the near future.
1 Geraats 
(2002) provides a theoretical framework to explain the rationale for increasing central bank 
transparency and the effects of different types of transparency. She differentiates between five 
types of transparency (see Figure 1). Political, economic, and operational transparency have 
the potential to enhance the credibility of a low inflation monetary policy. Procedural 
transparency is an obvious determinant of the quality of decision-making, and policy 
transparency can boost the effectiveness of interest rate setting. 
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Source: Geraats (2002, F 541). 
 
The empirical literature mostly finds beneficial effects of transparency. Van der 
Cruijsen and Eijffinger (2010) review the literature and conclude that transparency (1) 
improves consensus across forecasters, (2) lowers inflation and anchors inflation expectations, 
(3) improves the credibility, reputation, and flexibility of central banks, (4) has no obvious 
influence on output and output variability, and (5) improves policy anticipation.
2 The 
objective of this paper is related to the last point, ‘policy anticipation’. We examine the 
impact of transparency on the course of short-term interest rates. One question is of particular 
interest: Does a higher degree of transparency improve the formation of expectations in the 
money market in the period between two interest rate decisions? 
                                                 
1 These inclinations can be provided via qualitative statements, e.g., as given by the European Central Bank and 
the Federal Reserve after every interest rate decision, or be even more sophisticated, e.g., as by the repo rate 
charts provided by the Sveriges Riksbank. The latter provide an explicit figure for the future repo rate over the 
next years in reference to different macroeconomic conditions. 
2 A more detailed and stylised overview of the empirical results can be found in van der Cruijsen (2008, 30). 4 
Our survey starts in January 1999 with the inception of the ECB and ends in July 
2007.
3 We focus on nine countries in this survey: Australia (AUS), Canada (CAN), the Euro 
area (EMU), Japan (JAP), New Zealand (NZ), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (SUI), the United 
Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US). Econometrically, we employ country-specific 
OLS models and a pooled OLS model to assess the following research questions: (1) Does 
transparency decrease the expectation bias in money markets? (2) Is the variation of money 
market expectations reduced by a higher degree of transparency? (3) Is transparency the only 
factor improving the formation of expectations in money markets or can central banks use 
frequent informal communication with the public as a substitute for transparency? As 
endogenous variables, we employ two newly constructed indicators that measure the bias and 
variation of money market expectations over the entire intermeeting period. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
and explains the paper’s contribution. Section 3 introduces the data set and explains our 
econometric methodology. Section 4 presents the country-specific results for the influence of 
transparency and communication on central banks’ ability to manage financial market 
expectations. Section 5 shows the corresponding pooled model results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature and Contribution 
In the recent literature, the effectiveness of central banking is measured by focussing on 
decision anticipation only, i.e., whether or not the actual interest rate decision was anticipated 
by financial markets. For example, Coppel and Connolly (2003) find that the extent to which 
market participants anticipate changes in the policy rate has gradually increased since the late 
1980s, as has the speed of reaction to interest rate announcements. The results are quite 
similar across the countries in their sample (AUS, CAN, EMU, JAP, NZ, SWE, UK, and US). 
Thus, it is difficult to discover the specific contribution of a certain transparency type or to 
isolate any specific preferred model of monetary policy transparency. In a more recent paper, 
Andersson and Hoffmann (2009) compare the performances of the forward guidance 
strategies adopted by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Norges Bank, and the Riksbank. 
They find evidence that all three central banks have been highly predictable in their monetary 
policy decisions, regardless of whether forward guidance involved publication of an own 
interest rate path. 
                                                 
3 Since the beginning of the recent financial crisis, money market rates are no longer aligned with the respective 
country’s target rate and, therefore, are no longer an appropriate indicator for the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. 5 
Many papers focus on the predictability of the Federal Reserve’s interest rate setting. 
Demiralp (2001) documents that most market rates adjust to anticipated policy actions prior to 
the actual announcement. Rafferty and Tomljanovich (2002) find that the forecasting error has 
decreased since 1994 for interest rates on US bonds for most maturity lengths. Lange et al. 
(2003) obtain similar results and identify two contributors to the enhanced predictability: 
gradualism in adjusting the Federal Funds interest rate target (i.e., autoregressive interest rate 
setting) and transparency regarding setting the target and future policy intentions. Finally, 
Swanson (2006) shows that since the late 1980s, US financial markets and private-sector 
forecasters have become less surprised by Federal Reserve announcements. 
Lildholdt  and Wetherilt (2004) show that the Bank of England’s predictability 
improved over the period 1975–2003, most markedly after the introduction of inflation 
targeting in 1992. They posit that this is due to greater transparency in the monetary policy 
process, in combination with the bank’s greater credibility. Finally, the Bank of Canada’s 
efforts to increase its transparency also have helped market participants more accurately 
anticipate pending monetary policy actions (Muller and Zelmer, 1999). 
Our work improves on the current literature in at least three ways. First, the impact of 
different transparency regimes is often measured only roughly by splitting the time series into 
subsamples. However, changes in transparency are often made gradually. Thus, splitting the 
observations into two or three subsamples fails to capture the effects of incremental change in 
monetary policy transparency. All central banks examined in this paper (Reserve Bank of 
Australia (RBA), Bank of Canada (BOC), European Central Bank (ECB), Bank of Japan 
(BOJ), Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), Sveriges Riksbank (Riksbank), Swiss 
National Bank (SNB), Bank of England (BOE), and Federal Reserve (Fed)) have increased 
their transparency at least once in the past 15 years. We thus provide a continuous test of the 
effects of transparency on the money market adjustment process between two interest rate 
decisions. We employ Eijffinger and Geraats’s (2006) transparency index (and its 
subcomponents) as an explanatory variable in our econometric setup and use one time series 
for each country instead of comparing several subsamples.
4 
Second, judging the success of monetary policy outcomes by employing a surprise 
measure, focussing mainly on decision days, is not a good reflection of what central banks 
actually do. Central banks attempt to manage financial market expectations over at least the 
period between two interest rate decisions and usually over an even longer horizon (de Haan 
                                                 
4 Note that some papers employ continuous tests of transparency changes. See, for instance, Geraats et al. (2006) 
for the impact of transparency on the level of interest rates or van der Cruijsen and Demertzis (2007) for the 
influence on inflation expectations. 6 
et al., 2007). Thus, a measure like Equation (1), which is commonly used in the literature, 
fails to capture the entire adjustment process in the markets. 
 1 ∆                      ∆                                                         , 
 
where the change in a short-term interest rate is explained by the change in the target rate. If 
the interest rate does not change significantly after target rate adjustments, monetary policy 
was correctly anticipated by the markets. Thus, another contribution of this paper is that we 
employ two indicators that incorporate the behaviour of short-term interest rates over the 
entire intermeeting period. This ensures that the success of central banking is measured not 
only by financial market reaction on interest rate decision days; our indicators also measure 
the bias and variation of money market expectations in the run-up to the (expected) decision. 
Third, focussing only on central bank transparency could be misleading. For example, 
the Fed has had a transparency index of 10 ever since 1999, whereas the Riksbank increased 
its transparency from 9.5 in 1999 to 15 in 2006 (Table A1 in the Appendix shows the index 
for our sample period). The Fed does not pre-commit itself in terms of formal rules, such as a 
prioritisation or quantification of its objectives. However, the Fed frequently uses informal 
communication (e.g., speeches by its officials) as a means of indicating its views of the 
economy and the likely future course of monetary policy.
5 Informal speeches are not included 
in the transparency index and thus it is of interest to discover whether and, if so, to what 
extent this type of communication plays a role in addition to central bank transparency. For 
every major central bank there is at least one study showing that communications other than 
postmeeting statements or monetary policy reports (both are captured by the transparency 
index) have an influence on financial markets.
6 To explore the impact of communication in 
this context, we include a measure of informal central bank communication in our analysis. 
 
3. Data and Econometric Methodology 
As dependent variables we employ two newly constructed measures that account for the 
course of short-term interest rates during the entire intermeeting period. (1) The bias indicator 
captures the deviation of money market rates from the ‘optimal’ rate. (2) The variation 
                                                 
5 From 1999 to 2007, Board of Governors’ members spoke to the public 648 times; Riksbank’s officials 
delivered 291 speeches during that period. 
6 For instance, see Guthrie and Wright (2000) for the RBNZ, Andersson et al. (2006) for the Riksbank, Connolly 
and Kohler (2004) for six central banks (RBA, BOC, ECB, RBNZ, BOE, and the Fed), Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2007) for the BOE, ECB, and the Fed, Hayo and Neuenkirch (2011) for the BOC, and Ranaldo and Rossi 
(2010) for the SNB. Blinder et al. (2008) provide a comprehensive overview of the theory of and evidence for 
central bank communication. 7 
indicator measures the fluctuation of money market rates around the ‘optimal’ rate given an 
error in expectations that is constant for every intermeeting period. 
 
Bias Indicator 
Consider a bond with a maturity of n days. According to the term structure of interest rates, 
the bond’s return equals a weighted average of the expected target for the overnight rate over 
that period. Equation (2) describes the relationship: 
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where ‘interest rate’ denotes the revenues on the bond with a maturity of n days and 
                   the expected target rate i days in the future based on all information 
available at day t. Modern central banking is often described as the ‘art of managing 
expectations’ (e.g., de Haan et al., 2007, 2). Thus, if a central bank is able to manage financial 
market expectations perfectly, the expectation operator on the right-hand side of Equation (2) 
disappears: 
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In the case of perfect management, the actual and optimal interest rate should be equal. Thus, 
the difference between the interest rates—the ‘bias’—is a good proxy for the central bank’s 
effectiveness: 
 4       
                   
                              
  
   
     ⁄
, 
 
where ‘bias’ measures the difference between the actual interest rate and optimal interest rate 
(for a maturity of 90 days). This paper aims at assessing the process of managing expectations 
between two interest rate decisions. Therefore, we aggregate the biases over each 
intermeeting period and normalise the indicator by the distance of two decisions as the length 
of the intermeeting period varies within and across central banks
7: 
                                                 
7 A different way to control for the intermeeting length is to include the distance between two decisions as a 
further exogenous variable in the econometric setup. However, interpretation of the bias indicator put forward in 
Equation (5) is more straightforward as it measures the ‘bias per intermeeting day’ instead of the ‘overall bias 
per intermeeting period’. 8 
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where m is the length of the k
th intermeeting period.
8 This composition of the bias indicator 
ensures that larger deviations from the ‘optimal interest rate’ are penalised more severely than 
smaller ones. In contrast, the bias indicator becomes smaller the better interest rates are 
aligned with the expected overnight rates over the next 90 days. 
Figure 2 shows US and Swedish three-month money market rates and the optimal 
interest rates based on weighted averages of the US and Swedish overnight rates (Federal 
Funds target rate, Riksbank’s repo rate). US money market rates follow the expected target 
rate closely (especially since 2002). Financial markets do not abruptly adjust if the central 
bank changes its target for the overnight rate. They seem to ‘know’ the central bank’s 
intentions and, thus, interest rates alter gradually in the run-up to the next (expected) interest 
rate decision. 
 
Figure 2: Short-Term and ‘Optimal Interest Rates’ for Sweden and the United States 
 
Sources: Riksbank, Fed, British Bankers Association, and own calculations. 
 
In the case of Sweden, money market rates co-move with the expected target rate 
(especially since 2002) but do not exactly follow the ‘optimal rate’. However, as in the US, 
Swedish financial markets seem to track changes in the expected target very closely. Thus, it 
might be of interest to allow for a time-varying expectations error and to assess the 
                                                 
8 Each ‘intermeeting period’ starts one day after the preceding interest rate decision and ends on the day of the 
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fluctuations of money market rates around the ‘optimal’ rate given an error in expectations 
that is constant for every intermeeting period. 
 
Variation Indicator 
The variation indicator measures the fluctuation of money market rates around the expected 
target rate while allowing for a constant expectation error during every intermeeting period: 
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where m is the length of the k
th intermeeting period, ‘bias’ is obtained from Equation (4), and 
the mean bias is calculated for the k
th intermeeting period. This indicator allows testing 
whether communication and transparency exert an influence on the variation of (biased) 
expectations. The composition of the indicator ensures that abrupt and huge changes in money 
market rates (e.g., caused by interest rate surprises) are penalised, whereas a smooth and 
gradual adjustment will result in a particularly low indicator—even though there might be an 




In the next step, we need to parameterise central bank transparency. The index from Eijffinger 
and Geraats (2006), which was updated by Siklos (2011), is commonly used.
10 This index 
captures all categories of the theoretical framework by Geraats (2002) and is available as a 
yearly time series covering our sample period. For each category (political, economic, 
procedural, policy, and operational transparency), three questions address different aspects of 
transparency (a short excerpt of the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) questionnaire can be found 
in the Appendix). The index is available for every question and the total index is created as a 
sum of the scores for the 15 questions. 
One would expect that each of the index’s five subcategories has a positive impact on 
the ability to steer financial market expectations, i.e., causes a decline in both indicators. 
Political transparency reveals the central bank’s policy objectives, ranks them according to 
their priority in case of multiple goals, or sometimes quantifies a primary objective. Economic 
                                                 
9 Table A2 in the Appendix sets forth descriptive statistics for the bias and variation indicator; Figure A1 
presents a graphical illustration of both variables. 
10 Dincer and Eichengreen (2009) use the same questionnaire as Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). There are other 
indices as well, e.g., Crowe and Meade (2008), who use the data of Fry et al. (2000). However, these indices are 
not available as a time series covering the sample period investigated in this paper. 10 
transparency refers to the economic information on which monetary policy is based, such as 
economic data, forecasts, or the central bank’s economic model. Thus, market participants are 
able to discover the central bank’s view of the economy. Procedural transparency involves an 
explicit monetary policy rule or strategy, an account for policy deliberations, and how a 
policy decision was reached. Policy transparency aims to provide prompt disclosure (and 
explanation) of policy decisions and an explicit inclination of likely future policy actions. 
Operational transparency involves a discussion of control errors in achieving operating 
targets and (unanticipated) macroeconomic disturbances. In addition to employing the overall 
index as an explanatory variable, we also take advantage of the subindices and individual 
questions to discover which transparency factors are particularly important. 
 
Central Bank Communication 
We evaluate the impact of informal central bank communication on the ability to manage 
expectations as to the future target rate. Some central banks communicate often with the 
public (e.g., the ECB and the Fed), while others (e.g., RBA, BOC, or RBNZ) engage in 
informal communication less frequently.
11 It could be argued that inflation-targeting countries 
do not need to communicate as frequently as, e.g., the United States, as their primary 
objective is explicitly quantified. However, even inflation-targeting countries need to enhance 
and maintain credibility. Furthermore, they have some room for discretion in their interest rate 
setting as they are mostly bound to an inflation band and not to a single figure. They can also 
experience unexpected macroeconomic disturbances and need to communicate their 
awareness of the disturbance and explain how they plan to deal with it.
12 However, every 
speech can contain valuable information for financial market agents, no matter the occasion 
for the speech, especially if the audience is given the opportunity to ask questions, e.g., about 
the future course of monetary policy or the economic outlook. Thus, every informal speech 
should be considered a potential source of information. Central banks can choose the number 
of speeches and their timing and thus they can use speeches as an additional and less 
formalised communication tool. 
Several papers show that communication often has a horizon beyond the next meeting 
(e.g., Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007, who examine the ECB, BOE, and the Fed; Neuenkirch, 
2009, who addresses the BOC and the Fed). Thus, communication during a given 
                                                 
11 Table A3 in the Appendix shows the number of speeches delivered by central bank governors during our 
sample period. 
12 One could also attribute the larger number of speeches in the United States and the EMU to those countries’ 
size. However, normalising the communication indicator for country size does not change the results presented 
in Sections 4 and 5. 11 
intermeeting period may not be an appropriate measure for the upcoming interest rate 
decision. Furthermore, there is some seasonality in communication as during the summer and 
at the beginning and end of the year there is notably less communication. To ensure 
comparability to the yearly transparency measure, we use an annual communication measure 
and employ the natural logarithm of speeches delivered during a particular year to facilitate 
comparison between different countries. 
 
Money Market Data 
As financial market data, we employ daily three-month money market rates over the period 
January 1999–July 2007.
13 For Canada, the sample starts in December 2000 with the 
introduction of fixed announcement dates for interest rate decisions. The RBNZ introduced 
the official cash rate as its operating instrument in March 1999. The SNB introduced a three-
month LIBOR band as the target zone in January 2000. Thus, the SUI sample starts at this 
point and we employ the midpoint of the band as the reference value for the hypothetical 
target rate. 
In September/October 1999, all money market rate series are characterised by a hump 
(see also Figures 2) that cannot be explained by the central bank’s interest rate setting or the 
uncertainty surrounding the future course of monetary policy. In fact, the hump is due to 
market perception of the so-called millennium problem (e.g., ECB, 1999) as market 
participants required a premium for the availability of funds at the turn of the year. To ensure 
that this event does not influence the results, we assign a dummy variable (dummy Y2K) for 
the intermeeting period(s) covering that event. Another dummy variable (dummy 9/11) 
absorbs the extraordinary events in the intermeeting period surrounding 9/11. 
 
Empirical Methodology 
Our econometric setup consists of an OLS model for each country to analyse the influence of 
country-specific differences in central bank transparency and communication on (i) the bias 
indicator and (ii) the variation indicator. The general specification is: 
 7            
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13 For AUS, CAN, EMU, JAP, SUI, UK, and US, we use three-month LIBOR rates obtained from the British 
Bankers Association. Money market rates for NZ and SWE are taken from the respective central bank websites. 12 
where  andare parameters and  is an i.i.d. error term. Heteroscedasticity-
consistent (White, 1980) or heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent (Newey and 
West, 1987) standard errors are used if necessary. 
 
4. Country-Specific Results 
Table 1a shows the results for the bias indicator in nine countries. The best fit, as measured by 
the R
2, is found for Switzerland (0.90) and the European Monetary Union (0.56). The model 
for JAP (0.13) performs worst in terms of explanatory power. The transparency indicator 
exerts a significant and theory-consistent bias-decreasing impact in five out of eight 
countries.
14 The largest impact can be found in Japan, as a one-unit increase in the index 
decreases the bias in money market expectations by 1.35 bps. The bias is also affected in SUI 
(–1.08 bps), the EMU (–0.95 bps), AUS (–0.63 bps), and SWE (–0.52 bps). In contrast, 
central bank communication has no systematic and positive influence on the bias indicator.
15  
The results for the variation indicator in nine countries are presented in Table 1b. The 
models for Canada (0.67), the European Monetary Union (0.64), and the United Kingdom 
(0.61) yield the best fit. The worst coefficients of determination are found for NZ (0.13) and 
JAP (0.11). As in case of the bias indicator, an increase in the transparency index is helpful in 
five out of eight countries. The largest influence is detected in the United Kingdom, as a one-
unit increase in the index decreases the variation of money market rates around the expected 
target rate (given an error) by 5.24 bps. A positive influence is also found in CAN (–4.11 
bps), AUS (–2.22 bps), the EMU (–0.51 bps), and SWE (–0.31 bps). Central bank 
communication decreases the variation indicator in five out of nine countries: a 1 percent 
increase in the number of speeches by SNB officials lowers the variation in money market 
expectations by 9.59 bps. Speeches by Fed (–9.12 bps), BOC (–4.14 bps), Riksbank (–2.95 
bps), and ECB (–2.60 bps) officials also significantly contribute to the central bank’s ability 
to reduce the variation in money market expectations between two interest rate decisions.
16 
 
                                                 
14 There is no variation in the US transparency index during our sample period. 
15 In the United States, a 1 percent increase in the number of speeches by Fed officials significantly causes a 
lower bias (–11.44 bps), but this is the only country for which such an effect occurs. In case of NZ and UK, we 
even find a detrimental influence of communication. 
16 In case of the BOE, we find a positive coefficient for central bank communication. 13 
Table 1a: Explaining the Bias in Money Market Expectations (Country-Specific Models) 
Bias Indicator 
   AUS  CAN  EMU  JAP  NZ  SUI  SWE  UK  US 
Constant  14.85  ***  9.74    16.88 **  16.87 ***  –14.01     11.35 ***  9.65 *  –7.75    53.28 *** 
Dummy  Y2K  4.26  ***  ––– 8.18 *** 2.61 **  0.45  ––– 4.89 *** 4.99 *** 5.21 *** 
Dummy  9/11  –0.52  **  3.82 *** 24.13 *** –3.09 ***  6.68  *** 20.27 ***  7.29 *** 11.71 *** 14.00 *** 
Communication –2.24  –0.19 –0.74 –0.82 2.67  ** –0.11 0.46 2.23 **  –11.44 *** 
Transparency  –0.63  *  –0.66    –0.95 ***  –1.35 **  0.94     –1.08 *  –0.52 ***  0.27    –––   
R
2  0.25 0.24 0.56 0.13 0.31 0.90 0.46 0.49 0.41 
Observations 92  53 137  137 67  33  76 102 69 
AR 1-2 Test  8.23  ***  20.33 ***  50.78 ***  193.3 ***  2.45  *  0.02 18.06 ***  8.79 ***  5.16 *** 
Hetero-X Test  1.56     1.90    2.10 *  4.97 ***  1.65     2.72 **  5.15 ***  5.61 ***  1.84   
Notes: ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. White (1980) standard errors are used if heteroscedasticity was detected. Newey-West (1987) standard errors are 
used if autocorrelation was detected. 
 
Table 1b: Explaining the Variation in Money Market Expectations (Country-Specific Models) 
Variation Indicator 
   AUS  CAN  EMU  JAP  NZ  SUI  SWE  UK  US 
Constant  31.85  *** 59.40 *** 18.67 ***  2.11     22.38      45.73 *** 17.88 *** 62.61 *** 42.99 *** 
Dummy Y2K  5.90  ***  ––– 20.25 ***  6.51 ***  3.03  ––– 16.57 ***  17.75 ***  16.03 *** 
Dummy 9/11  5.68  ***  –4.12 **  13.58 ***  0.14    4.81  **  –1.60    8.61 ***  –0.32    2.77   
Communication –2.19  –4.14 ***  –2.60 ***  –0.15 –0.73  –9.59 ** –2.95 **  1.60 **  –9.12 *** 
Transparency  –2.22  ***  –4.11 ***  –0.51 ***  –0.09    –1.25     –1.32    –0.31 **  –5.24 ***  –––   
R
2  0.32 0.67 0.64 0.11 0.13 0.42 0.47 0.61 0.45 
Observations 92  53 137  137 67  33  76 102 69 
AR 1-2 Test  4.25  **  2.06 1.45 11.54 ***  0.01  2.45 2.29 2.13 1.91
Hetero-X Test  1.17     1.34    2.49 **  1.21    1.52     2.56 *  1.27    1.47    2.28   
Notes: ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. White (1980) standard errors are used if heteroscedasticity was detected. Newey-West (1987) standard errors are 
used if autocorrelation was detected. 14 
Considering both indicators, the most pronounced results are found for the EMU and 
SWE, where communication and transparency decrease the variation of money market 
expectations and transparency mitigates the bias in expectations. In general, transparency is 
beneficial in mitigating the bias in money market expectations and in dampening the variation 
of expectations (given an error), whereas communication contributes positively only in the 
latter case. The literature on central bank communication finds that speeches by central bank 
officials move interest rates in the intended direction (Blinder et al., 2008) but does not test 
for a potential bias to an optimal rate. Therefore, the finding that communication only lowers 
the variation indicator (moves money market rates in the intended direction) does not 
contradict the existing literature. Another noteworthy finding is that two central banks with a 
relatively low degree of formal transparency (the SNB and Fed) show the largest coefficients 
for central bank communication. Thus, an increase in informal communications might be a 
substitute for formal transparency (at least in case of the variation indicator). 
To ensure the robustness of our findings and obtain further insights, we conduct 
several experiments. First, we control for US and ECB interest rate setting in the other 
countries’ regressions. We find no significant and systematic influence, which implies that the 
interest rate setting of the largest two central banks is no surprise to central banks and market 
participants in other countries. Second, we differentiate between communication by the 
respective committee’s head and that by other members of the decision-making body. The 
results indicate that there is no additional impact when the head is speaking. Finally, instead 
of using the aggregated transparency index, we employ its subindices to discover which 
transparency factors are particularly important. However, there is rarely enough variation 




5. Multi-Country Results 
To explore the influence of the transparency subindices in more detail, we utilise a pooled 
model including all nine countries. Pooling the countries increases the variation in the 
subindices and thus makes it possible to discover which transparency factors are particularly 
important.
18 The multi-country model cannot be estimated as a balanced panel as each of the 
central banks has its own interest rate setting calendar, with substantial variation in the 
                                                 
17 All omitted results are available on request. 
18 Furthermore, a pooled model allows for more efficient estimation of the coefficients due to a gain in the 
number of observations. An obvious drawback is the assumption of equal coefficients across countries and a 
common error structure. Nonetheless, the selection of a homogenous group of countries should minimise these 
potential problems. 15 
number of target rate decisions per year. Thus, we estimate the corresponding pooled OLS 
model for Equation (7) using (i) the bias indicator and (ii) the variation indicator. The general 
specification is: 
 8             , 
               2            9/11                     
                   ,                    ,      , , 
 
where andare parameters,  is an i.i.d. error term, and the variables are defined 
as above. The only difference from Equation (7) is that country-specific effects are included 
using the United States as reference country. 
Table 2 shows the results of the pooled model. Models (1)–(3) employ the bias 
indicator as endogenous variable: Model (1) uses both communication and transparency as 
explanatory variables, Model (2) includes only the communication measure, and Model (3) 
focuses on the transparency index. The fit of the models (measured by the R
2) is nearly the 
same: the joint model (Model (1)) and the transparency model (Model (3)) perform 
marginally better (0.32) than the communication model (Model (2)) (0.28). Confirming the 
findings of the country-specific models, communication does not significantly affect the bias 
in money market expectations. However, transparency significantly lowers the bias: if a 
central bank chooses to increase its transparency (measured by a one-unit change in the 
index), the bias indicator is reduced by 0.76 bps (–0.77 in Model (3)). 
The right-hand side of Table 2 shows the results for the corresponding models 
employing the variation indicator as endogenous variable. All three models yield almost the 
same fit: the joint model (Model (1’)) performs marginally better (0.37) than the other models 
(Model (2’): 0.35; Model (3’): 0.34). In line with the results of the country-specific models, 
both communication and transparency reduce the variation in money market expectations: A 1 
percent increase in the number of central bank speeches decreases the variation indicator by 
2.03 bps (–2.17 bps in Model (2’)). A one-unit increase in the transparency index reduces the 
variation by 0.53 bps (–0.56 in Model (3’)). 
There is not much variation in the coefficients for transparency or communication 
across different models for either indicator, indicating that there is no noticeable degree of 
collinearity. Formal transparency and informal communication are almost orthogonal,
19 in 
                                                 
19 Including an interaction term between communication and transparency to Models (1) and (1’) yields 
insignificant coefficients and confirms this impression. 16 
line with the statistics in Tables A1 and A3: central banks with a high frequency of informal 
speeches are not necessarily the most transparent, and vice versa.
20 
 
Table 2: Explaining Bias and Variation in Money Market Expectations (Pooled Model) 
   Bias Indicator Variation Indicator 
    (1) (2) (3)  (1’)  (2’)  (3’) 
Constant 14.09  ** 7.43 ** 11.79 **    17.75 ** 13.08  ** 9.40 **
Dummy Y2K  5.14  ** 5.95 ** 5.06 ** 12.82 ** 13.39  ** 12.52 **
Dummy 9/11  9.65  ** 9.95 ** 9.75 **    4.34 ** 4.55  ** 4.71 **
AUS –2.56  *  –3.05 **  –1.63 *  –3.56 ** –3.87  ** –0.22
CAN  –2.35  *  –3.26 ** –1.47 –2.93 ** –3.54  ** 0.26
EMU  0.39  0.49 0.36 –1.31 ** –1.25  ** –1.45 ** 
JAP –3.20  **  –2.65 *  –2.16 **  –7.36 ** –6.94  ** –3.59 **
NZ 1.36  –1.99 2.75 ** –2.92 * –5.22  ** 2.07 ** 
SUI –3.86  ** –3.13 ** –3.15 ** –1.96 –1.45 0.60
SWE 2.19  *  –0.14 2.68 ** –0.23 –1.83 **  1.52
UK 0.40  –1.66 0.96 –1.59 *  –3.01  ** 0.41
Communication  –0.56     –0.79    –––       –2.03 ** –2.17  ** –––   
Transparency –0.76  ** –––    –0.77 **    –0.53 ** –––     –0.56 **
R
2  0.32 0.28 0.32  0.37 0.35 0.34 
Observations 766 766 766  766 766 766 
Country Effects  10.55  ** 6.96 ** 10.85 ** 8.51 ** 11.04  ** 8.43 **
AR 1–2 Test  241.4  ** 260.4 ** 242.6 ** 29.52 ** 36.64  ** 37.31 **
Hetero–X Test  6.93  ** 7.13 ** 7.93 **    5.74 ** 6.02  ** 5.97 **
Notes: ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. White (1980) standard errors are used if 
heteroscedasticity was detected. Newey-West (1987) standard errors are used if autocorrelation was detected. 
 
Another novel aspect of this paper is that we assess the influence of all subcategories 
of Eijffinger and Geraats’s (2006) transparency index (political, economic, procedural, policy, 
and operational). The results for both indicators are displayed in Table 3.
21 The upper (lower) 
line shows the results using the bias (variation) indicator as endogenous variable. 
 
Table 3: Assessing Different Categories of Transparency (Pooled Model)  
Political Economic Procedural Policy O perational
Bias  Indicator  –3.27 ***  –1.63 ***  –1.71 **  –2.40 ***  –0.22    
Variation  Indicator  –5.93 ***  –0.95 ***  –1.70 **  –1.05 **  –1.50 * 
Notes: ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. White (1980) standard errors are used if 
heteroscedasticity was detected. Newey-West (1987) standard errors are used if autocorrelation was detected. 
Full tables are available on request. 
 
                                                 
20 The correlation coefficient between average communication and average transparency per country over the 
sample period is –0.14. 
21 Including all five subcategories in one model results in collinearity problems. 17 
Although all subcategories have a theory-consistent declining impact on both 
indicators,
22 there is some variation across different subindices.
23 The largest impact for the 
bias indicator and the variation indicator in our sample is found for political transparency, 
which has to do with openness about policy objectives (e.g., a formal statement and 
prioritization of objectives or a quantification of the primary objective). If a central bank has a 
clear and quantified mandate, e.g., an inflation target, it is very easy for market participants to 
anticipate the bank’s future monetary policy. 
Procedural transparency ranks second (third) in the case of the variation (bias) 
indicator. It includes (among other things) an explicit monetary policy rule and an account of 
policy deliberations. This helps explain how past decisions were reached and thus facilitates 
prediction of interest rates in the near future. Geraats (2002) views policy transparency as a 
factor that could boost the effectiveness of interest rate setting. Thus, it is not surprising that 
the prompt disclosure and explanation of policy decisions and an explicit policy indication of 
likely future policy action has a larger impact on the bias indicator than all other categories 
(except political transparency). However, in the case of the variation indicator, its impact only 
exceeds that of economic transparency. Finally, in our sample, economic transparency
24 
seems to be less important than the other subcategories. Currently, publicly available 
macroeconomic data and forecasts are almost as accurate as those provided by the central 
bank. Thus, there may not be much benefit in the bank providing the public with internal data 
and the macroeconomic model. 
The data set by Siklos (2011) also provides the scores for all 15 questions utilised in 
creating the index. Table 4 sets out the results for 10 of the 15 questions and both indicators.
25 
In the case of the bias indicator, a subcategory of operational transparency (Q5c) performs 
best among the 10 items analysed: A regular evaluation of the central bank’s policy outcome 
in light of its macroeconomic objective has the largest decreasing influence on the bias in 
money market expectations. Market participants learn whether or not monetary policy is 
beneficiary to the central bank’s macroeconomic objectives and thus can alter their 
expectations about future interest rates if necessary. Also noteworthy is the influence of Q4b: 
                                                 
22 The coefficient for operational transparency is insignificant in the regression employing the bias indicator as 
an endogenous variable. 
23 We also try to evaluate the impact of conditional policy rate projections (not captured by the index) as 
published by the RBNZ since 1999 and by the Riksbank since 2007. However, the coefficient is insignificant as 
the variable mostly coincides with the country-specific effects for NZ. 
24 Table 4 shows that Q5a has a detrimental impact on both indicators, which explains the poor performance of 
operational transparency. 
25 We are able to employ only 10 of these questions as (i) in some cases the variation coincides with country 
dummies and we cannot distinguish the impact from a country-specific effect or (ii) there is no variation in the 
variable at all. Therefore, Q1b and Q1c (political transparency), Q3a and Q3b (procedural transparency), and 
Q4a (policy transparency) were omitted from the analysis. 18 
an explanation helps agents understand the rationale for a given interest rate decision and, 
accordingly, to alter their expectations for future decisions. 
A subcategory of political transparency (Q1a) exerts the largest influence on the 
variation of money market expectations among the 10 items analysed: every central bank in 
our sample provides a formal statement of the objective(s) of monetary policy; thus, it is 
explicit prioritization in case of multiple objectives that helps market participants better 
understand the central bank’s intentions. Second in terms of reaction size is Q5b: the 
provision of information on (unanticipated) macroeconomic disturbances helps market 
participants (i) become aware of a disturbance and (ii) understand how the central bank plans 
to deal with it. As a consequence, transparent dealing with disturbances reduces market 
uncertainty and decreases the variation indicator. 
 
Table 4: Assessing Different Questions of the Transparency Index (Pooled Model)  
   Q1a  Q2a Q2b Q2c  Q3c
Bias  Indicator  –3.27  *** –3.22 *** –1.85 *** –3.63  *** –1.71 ** 
Variation  Indicator  –5.93  *** –2.54 **  –0.99 *** –2.38  *** –1.70 ** 
 
   Q4b  Q4c Q5a Q5b  Q5c
Bias Indicator  –4.23  ***  –1.71 **  4.61 **  –3.65  ***  –6.00 *** 
Variation Indicator  –0.90     –1.70 **  0.57    –5.51  ***  –1.34   
Notes: ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. White (1980) standard errors are used if 
heteroscedasticity was detected. Newey-West (1987) standard errors are used if autocorrelation was detected. An 
excerpt of the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) questionnaire can be found in the Appendix. Full tables are available 
on request. 
 
Finally, in the recent empirical literature (van der Cruijsen et al., 2010) it is shown that 
there might be a limit to the benefits of transparency and that, in fact, an intermediate degree 
of transparency might be desirable. As part of our robustness tests we estimated Equation (8) 
with ‘communication
2’ and ‘transparency
2’ as additional exogenous variables. However, the 





In this paper, we study the influence of central bank transparency and informal central bank 
communication on the formation of money market expectations. The sample covers nine 
major central banks (RBA, BOC, ECB, BOJ, RBNZ, Riksbank, SNB, BOE, and the Fed) 
                                                 
26 Full tables are available on request. 19 
from January 1999 to July 2007. We employ a continuous test for the influence of both factors 
using two indicators that account for the bias and variation of money market expectations 
during the entire intermeeting period. Country-specific OLS models and a pooled OLS model 
reveal several interesting results. 
First, in the case of the country-specific models, transparency mitigates the bias in 
money market expectations and dampens the variation of expectations (given an error in 
expectations). A higher degree of transparency leads to a lower expectation bias in AUS, the 
EMU, JAP, SUI, and SWE, whereas the variation of expectations is reduced in AUS, CAN, 
the EMU, SWE, and the UK. In contrast, central bank communication only contributes in the 
case of the variation indicator. Informal central bank speeches by the BOC, ECB, SNB, 
Riksbank, and Fed reduce the variation of expectations. Thus, informal communications do 
help manage financial market expectations but not to the same extent as formal transparency 
measures. Another finding is that two central banks with a relatively low degree of formal 
transparency (the SNB and Fed) show the largest coefficients for central bank 
communication. An increase in informal communications might be a substitute for formal 
transparency (at least in the case of the variation indicator). The pooled regressions confirm 
the country-specific results: transparency mitigates the bias and dampens the variation of 
expectations, whereas communication contributes only in the latter case. Furthermore, we 
show that formal transparency and informal communication are almost orthogonal in their 
influence on both variables. 
Second, the pooled model permits a more detailed examination of the subcategories of 
the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) index: all subcategories have a theory-consistent decreasing 
impact on the bias and variation of money market expectations. However, in our sample, 
political transparency, procedural transparency, and policy transparency seem to be more 
important than economic transparency. The detailed data provided by Siklos (2011) also 
enable assessing 10 out of 15 items of the original questionnaire. In the case of the bias in 
money market expectations, the regular evaluation of the central bank’s policy outcome in 
light of its macroeconomic objectives (a subcategory of operational transparency) and the 
provision of an explanation of interest rate decisions (policy transparency) have the largest 
decreasing influence of the 10 items analysed. An explicit prioritization in the case of multiple 
objectives (political transparency) and the provision of information on (unanticipated) 
macroeconomic disturbances (operational transparency) contribute to a lower variation in 
money market expectations. 20 
The countries studied in this paper are relatively homogenous. All of their central 
banks rely on a short-term interest rate as the main instrument of monetary policy, none of 
them faces severe inflation problems, and each of them is characterised by a relatively high 
degree of transparency. Investigating emerging markets that have more variation in their 
monetary regimes and greater concerns about inflation would be an interesting task for future 
research.  21 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Transparency Indices 
    1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
AUS  9.5  9.5  9.5  10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
CAN  10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5  11  11  11  11 
EMU  8.5  8.5 10  10.5  10.5  11 11 11 11 
JAP  8 8.5 8  8  8 9.5  9.5  10 10 
NZ  13 13  13.5  14 14 14 14 14 14 
SUI  7 7.5 8  8  9 9.5  9.5  9.5  9.5 
SWE  9.5  11.5 11.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5  15  15 
UK  12  12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 
US  10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Source: Siklos (2011). 
 
 
Table A2a: Descriptive Statistics of the Bias Indicator 
Observat. Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Minimum  Maximum
Overall  766 3.68 3.30 2.63 0.09  28.41 
AUS  92  2.59 1.78 1.11 0.27 9.38 
CAN  53  2.20 1.24 0.71 0.45 6.28 
EMU  137 4.80 3.96 2.65 0.49  28.41 
JAP  137 3.15 3.86 1.85 0.21  21.36 
NZ  67  4.16 1.88 0.89 0.98  10.94 
SUI  33  2.22 3.98 4.54 0.09  22.68 
SWE  76  4.82 2.64 1.01 0.59  12.51 
UK  102 3.39 2.24 2.33 0.36  15.45 
US  69  4.44 4.48 2.87 1.06  26.43 
 
 
Table A2b: Descriptive Statistics of the Variation Indicator 
Variation Observat.  Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Minimum  Maximum
Overall  766 3.02 3.14 2.81 0.00  25.61 
AUS  92  3.63 2.66 1.55 0.47  15.31 
CAN  53  3.67 2.56 1.15 0.43  11.79 
EMU  137 2.48 2.81 3.85 0.14  22.54 
JAP  137 1.00 1.75 3.69 0.03  12.62 
NZ  67  3.97 2.32 1.77 1.15  14.18 
SUI  33  5.22 5.79 2.62 0.60  25.61 
SWE  76  3.89 3.50 2.32 0.12  20.85 
UK  102 2.95 2.80 4.07 0.20  22.99 
US  69  4.00 3.73 1.77 0.00  20.42 
  24 
Table A3: Number of Speeches Delivered by Central Bank Governors 
   1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
AUS 17 13 14 13 12 12 17 19 14 
CAN  8  7  7  18 17 15 19 18 24 
EMU 102 68  68  59  65 100 80  96 111 
JAP  11 10  8  8  18  9  13 18 15 
NZ  10  10  8 4 5 6 6 9 7 
SUI  18 13 13 23 21 23 31 27 21 
SWE 37 36 28 30 20 37 42 41 34 
UK  31 37 38 28 17 27 26 30 36 
US  69 63 62 78 72  102  87 73 72 
Note: The figures in 2007 contain only speeches delivered in the period January–July 2007 due to a considerable 
increase of central bank communication with the beginning of the recent financial crisis. To ensure 
comparability with the earlier years, figures for the first seven months of 2007 are projected for a total year. 
Source: Central bank websites and own calculations. 25 
Figure A1: Bias and Variation Indicator for Nine Central Banks 
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European Monetary Union Variation26 
Figure A1: Bias and Variation Indicator for Nine Central Banks (continued) 
   
   









































Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07
Switzerland Variation27 
Figure A1: Bias and Variation Indicator for Nine Central Banks (continued) 
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United States Variation28 
Transparency Index Questionnaire 
Source: Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). 
1. Political Transparency 
a) Is there a formal statement of the objective(s) of monetary policy, with an explicit 
prioritization in case of multiple objectives? 
b) Is there a quantification of the primary objective(s)? 
c) Are there explicit contracts or other similar institutional arrangements between the 
monetary authorities and the government? 
 
2. Economic Transparency 
a) Is the basic economic data relevant for the conduct of monetary policy publicly available? 
b) Does the central bank disclose the macroeconomic model(s) it uses for policy analysis? 
c) Does the central bank regularly publish its own macroeconomic forecasts? 
 
3. Procedural Transparency 
a) Does the central bank provide an explicit policy rule or strategy that describes its monetary 
policy framework? 
b) Does the central bank give a comprehensive account of policy deliberations (or 
explanations in case of a single central banker) within a reasonable amount of time? 
c) Does the central bank disclose how each decision on the level of its main operating 
instrument or target was reached? 
 
4. Policy Transparency 
a) Are decisions about adjustments to the main operating instrument or target announced 
promptly? 
b) Does the central bank provide an explanation when it announces policy decisions? 
c) Does the central bank disclose an explicit policy inclination after every policy meeting or 
an explicit indication of likely future policy actions (at least quarterly)? 
 
5. Operational Transparency 
a) Does the central bank regularly evaluate to what extent its main policy operating targets (if 
any) have been achieved? 
b) Does the central bank regularly provide information on (unanticipated) macroeconomic 
disturbances that affect the policy transmission process? 
c) Does the central bank regularly provide an evaluation of the policy outcome in light of its 
macroeconomic objectives? 